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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2048 
___________ 
 
PHILLIP A. MOODIE, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A088-439-880) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Jesus Clemente 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 13, 2011 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 14, 2011) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Phillip Moodie, a citizen of Jamaica, seeks review of a decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding the denial of his application for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  
For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
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I. 
 Moodie entered the United States most recently on January 30, 2008.  In April 
2010, he was detained by federal immigration authorities after he was arrested on a state 
charge and placed in removal proceedings for overstaying his visa.  He conceded 
removability, but filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the CAT based on his fear that, if returned to Jamaica, he would be persecuted by 
drug dealers because he had worked as a confidential informant for Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 
 Moodie claimed that, beginning in the summer of 2007, he served as an informant 
to ICE Special Agent Vance Callender.  At a hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), 
he testified that he met with Callender three times and provided information on numerous 
drug dealers that he acquired through a friend who worked as a disc jockey at the drug-
dealers’ parties.  In November 2007, Moodie travelled to the United States on a work 
visa.  He testified that, when he returned to Jamaica on January 28, 2008, he learned from 
his friends, Jason and Floyd, that the drug dealers upon whom he informed had placed 
him on a hit list.  Additionally, his apartment in Jamaica had been broken into, and he 
assumed that the drug dealers were responsible because the place was ransacked and his 
furniture destroyed.  Moodie returned to the United States two days later and 
subsequently terminated his relationship with Callender.  In support of his claims, he 
prepared a list of individuals, including the Prime Minister of Jamaica, upon whom he 
had allegedly informed.   
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 On cross-examination, the government introduced an email from Callender stating 
that Moodie wanted to be an informant but that he had no useful information.  Callender 
added that Moodie “only was trying to get a visa” and that he “did absolutely no work for 
ICE and constantly tries to use his association with ICE (which consists of one meeting) 
to get around.”  (R. 253.)  After being presented with the email, Moodie asked the IJ for 
an opportunity to produce email correspondence between himself and Callender, which 
the IJ found to be a dilatory tactic and denied because of the last-minute nature of the 
request.  On the same basis, the IJ denied Moodie’s request to subpoena Callender and 
another ICE agent who allegedly spoke with Callender at Moodie’s request, observing 
that Moodie had plenty of time to submit subpoenas before the hearing but did not do so. 
 The IJ concluded that Moodie’s asylum claim was time-barred and rejected his 
remaining claims based upon his finding that Moodie did not testify credibly.  
Accordingly, the IJ ordered Moodie removed to Canada with the United Kingdom as an 
alternate, per Moodie’s request, but also designated Jamaica as an alternate in the event 
the other countries did not accept him.  The BIA dismissed Moodie’s appeal, essentially 
adopting the IJ’s decision in its entirety, and declined to remand based on additional 
documents that Moodie submitted, which included subpoenas for the witnesses he was 
precluded from presenting at the hearing.  Moodie filed a timely pro se petition for 
review.
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      II. 
 This Court has jurisdiction to review the final order of removal pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1252.  However, our review is limited to Moodie’s withholding of removal and 
CAT claims because we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s determination that 
Moodie’s asylum application is untimely.1  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); Tarrawally v. 
Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2003).  We review the findings upon which the 
BIA’s decision rests for substantial evidence, but exercise de novo review over the BIA’s 
legal conclusions and Moodie’s due process claims.  Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 
379 (3d Cir. 2010); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595-96 (3d Cir. 2003).  We 
may review the IJ’s decision because it was implicitly adopted by the BIA.  See Zhang v. 
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 Moodie contends that the agency erred in finding his testimony not credible.  We, 
however, conclude that the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was supported by “specific, 
cogent reasons” for discrediting Moodie’s testimony.  Thu v. Att’y Gen., 510 F.3d 405, 
412 (3d Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted).  The IJ found that Moodie lied about serving as 
an informant due to Callender’s email to the contrary.  Additionally, the IJ found 
Moodie’s testimony concerning his alleged persecution by drug dealers not to be credible 
because (1) he failed to provide any details regarding the drug organization that he 
                                              
1
 We also lack jurisdiction to consider Moodie’s challenges to his detention, which must 
be pursued in a petition for habeas corpus.  See Nnadika v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d 626, 
630-33 (3d Cir. 2007).  Nor may we consider his allegations that his constitutional rights 
were violated during the course of his state criminal proceeding. 
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allegedly fears; (2) despite testifying that he knew Jason and Floyd since before high 
school, Moodie, who was 27 years old when he encountered them in Jamaica, did not 
know their surnames; (3) it was implausible that Jason and Floyd would know of a threat 
against Moodie based solely on the fact that they are “street kids” who “know 
everything”; (4) Moodie’s assertion that drug dealers broke into his apartment was mere 
speculation; and (5) Moodie could have compiled his list of drug dealers from 
information in the public domain.  (R. 59-63.)   
 Moodie does little to undermine those reasons, other than stating his belief that he 
testified credibly and questioning the IJ’s conclusion that his list of alleged drug dealers 
could have been fabricated.  But even removing that reason from the calculus, the IJ’s 
remaining reasons for rejecting Moodie’s testimony are firmly supported by the record 
and justify the adverse credibility determination.
2
  See Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 
226 (3d Cir. 2004).  Accordingly, the agency appropriately rejected Moodie’s claims 
based on the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. 
 Moodie also alleges myriad due process violations, many of which are grounded 
in his inability to call witnesses or produce information establishing that he was, in fact, 
an ICE informant.
3
  We lack jurisdiction to consider Moodie’s allegation that the IJ 
                                              
2
 Because Moodie filed his application after the enactment of the REAL ID Act, the 
inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods upon which the IJ’s adverse credibility 
finding is based need not go the heart of his claims.  See § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).  
Regardless, the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods relied on by the IJ in finding 
Moodie not credible do, in fact, go to the heart of his claims. 
3
 We agree with the government that, to the extent Moodie alleges violations of 
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violated his due process rights by denying his request to subpoena witnesses because 
Moodie failed to challenge that procedural ruling before the BIA.
4
  See Khan v. Att’y 
Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006).  We also reject Moodie’s contention that the 
BIA violated due process by failing to acknowledge his subpoenas or mandate “an all-out 
investigation by the Department of Justice.”  The BIA has no authority to subpoena 
witnesses or order the Department of Justice to conduct an internal investigation, and 
generally may not consider new evidence on appeal.
5
  See Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 
584, 592 (3d Cir. 2009); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).  Furthermore, the BIA 
acted within its discretion in refusing to remand based on Moodie’s belated subpoenas, 
especially since there is no indication that his witnesses would have changed the outcome 
of his case.  See Caushi v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2006); see supra n.4.   
 Moodie’s remaining due process claims also lack merit.  First, although the IJ 
could have been more lenient with Moodie, nothing in the record reflects bias or 
                                                                                                                                                  
additional constitutional rights without describing the basis for those violations, he has 
waived those claims.  See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 161 (3d Cir. 2008). 
4
 Even if he had raised the issue, Moodie cannot establish substantial prejudice, as is 
necessary to prevail on his due process claim.  See Delgado-Sobalvarro v. Att’y Gen., 
625 F.3d 782, 787 (3d Cir. 2010).  Assuming that Moodie’s witnesses would have 
testified to his status as an ICE informant, which is unlikely, Moodie still cannot 
overcome the IJ’s finding that he failed to testify credibly concerning the January 2008 
events that form the basis for his withholding of removal and CAT claims.  Furthermore, 
Moodie had a sufficient opportunity to request witnesses before the hearing, but never 
applied for a subpoena or asked the IJ for an extension so that he could pursue additional 
evidence.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.35 & 1003.31(c).     
5
 The subpoenas that Moodie submitted to this Court in support of his petition for review 
are equally futile, as our review is limited to the administrative record.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(b)(4)(A). 
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improper conduct so as to support a conclusion that the IJ abandoned his role as a neutral 
fact-finder.  See Wang v. Att’y Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267-70 (3d Cir. 2005); Abdulrahman, 
330 F.3d at 596-97.  Second, Moodie’s assertion that the BIA violated due process by 
failing to consider all of the evidence – which seems to be based solely on the fact that 
the agency rejected his claims – lacks merit because the adverse credibility finding upon 
which the BIA’s decision rests is supported by the record.  Third, we have rejected the 
applicability of a state-created danger theory in immigration cases, so Moodie is not 
entitled to any relief on that basis.  See Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 217-18 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Finally, we reject Moodie’s claim that the BIA violated Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 34 as well as his procedural due process rights because one Board 
member denied his request for oral argument instead of a three-judge panel.
6
  Rule 34 is 
inapplicable to the BIA, which is instead governed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e), and the BIA 
clearly complied with that regulation in rejecting Moodie’s request for oral argument.  
See § 1003.1(e)(7) (“No oral argument will be allowed in a case that is assigned for 
disposition by a single Board member.”).  
 For the above reasons, we will deny Moodie’s petition for review.  
                                              
6
 The government contends that we lack jurisdiction to address that claim.  To the 
contrary, we have jurisdiction over claims that the agency violated its own procedural 
rules, which is the apparent basis for Moodie’s allegation here.  See Purveegiin v. 
Gonzales, 448 F.3d 684, 688-92 (3d Cir. 2006) (jurisdiction existed over claim that BIA 
was required to refer petitioner’s case for three-member review); see also Billeke-Tolosa 
v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 708, 709 (6th Cir. 2004). 
